The F-35 portion of this report looks like it was ghost-written by defence with little for the ANAO to do.
F-35:
--"Materiel Capability Delivery Performance
The capability of the F-35A JSF Air System is now reaching a level of maturity where the project is confident it will be able to meet the agreed threshold level of capability required for IOC in 2020."
--"The US Government has contracted with Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney on Australia’s behalf in accordance with US contracting laws, regulations and procedures."
Not true. The U.S. government is engaging in low-rate initial production of the F-35 without, U.S. DOD procurement milestone C in place. That is not legal.
--"The JSF is characterised by a low observable (stealth) design, internal weapons and fuel carriage, advanced electro-optical and infrared sensors, long range, the ability to employ a wide range of air-to-surface and airto-air weapons, advanced communications suite to enable network centric operations, state of the art prognostics and health management, a single interchangeable engine and reduced support requirements."--
Yet, all those things mentioned are extreme risk of not meeting key performance indicator (KPI) goals. Nothing in that quote is supportable because it does not characterize the F-35 as it is today. Disconnect from what else is stated.
--"The Australian F-35A JSF capability is to be supported under a global support arrangement (referred to as ‘Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment’) through performance-based contracts."
With ALIS seriously under-performing.
--"The JSF is a large and complex program and many challenges remain."
The entrenched defence bureaucracy uses the word "complex" a lot. It is a throw away word meant to tell the reader that these things are, well, "complex". So many things in this ANAO document support my 'ghost-writing-by-defence-claim". This is one of them: "complex".
Those trying to cover themselves use the word to tell us setbacks are to be expected. It is a backup word for under-achievers to use. These are the people warming chairs being paid well more than their worth. Most projects are "complex". However, here is an established history of project performance of these kinds of people.
In the late 1990s , many who knew how to manage ..."complex" projects and deliver....were purged and replaced by generalist managers. These are the people who don't know what they don't know and can't be bothered to understand. Where, the blame-shifter wizard in Microsoft Word is a prized computer skill.
So with that last tiny quote above, they already stated this earlier in the document:
"The capability of the F-35A JSF Air System is now reaching a level of maturity where the project is confident it will be able to meet the agreed threshold level of capability required for IOC in 2020."
Bold emphasis added. Based on what evidence? Define "maturity" as it pertains to established government project management manuals.
--"Major Risks and Issues
The JSF is a large and complex program and many challenges remain. While as a MoU Partner Australia
does have a role, overcoming technical challenges is primarily a US responsibility.
The major risks facing the NACC Project are:
• Possibility of US and JSF Partner Governments altering commitments to the broader JSF Program that
impacts Australian acquisition and life-cycle costs.
• Integration of the JSF into the ADF systems.
• Establishing the required facilities and Information, Communications and Technology (ICT) infrastructure
to support stand up of the JSF capability.
• Lack of timely data and releaseability of JSF program information that impacts the timely, efficient and
effective integration of the F-35 aircraft system into the Australian Defence Force.
• The maturity of the JSF System and ability to meet IOC and FOC.
• Transition of the JSF into service at the same time RAAF ramps up Australian Super Hornet and Growler
capabilities.
• Establishing and ramping up the JSF sustainment system.
• Establishing the Reprogramming element of the program.
• Ensuring required industry outcomes during JSF production and transition into service.
• Significant workforce challenges in effectively manning the Defence acquisition and sustainment
organisations impacts program management activities to establish the JSF capability.
The major issues facing the NACC Project are:
• Noise associated with the introduction of the JSF at RAAF Base Williamtown.
• Establishing the training system."
"Maturity". Not seeing it. Read more below.
-Australia gave second-pass approval to F-35 based on fact-free analysis
-Failure: JIRD or JORD, today's F-35 is obsolete to the threat
-F-35 law-fare
-Australia's F-35s are behind schedule, and not by a little bit.
-Our elected officials should reject the F-35, this is why
-Australian F-35 industry participation not living the dream
Some more numbers for the ANAO:
“It’s about $37 million for the CTOL aircraft, which is the air force variant.”
- Colonel Dwyer Dennis, U.S. JSF Program Office brief to Australian journalists, 2002-
". . . US$40 million dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Media Air Commodore John Harvey, AM Angus Houston, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003-
" . . US$45 million in 2002 dollars . ."
-JSCFADT/Senate Estimates, Air Commodore John Harvey, Mr Mick Roche, USDM, 2003/2004-
". . average unit recurring flyaway cost of the JSF will be around US$48 million, in 2002 dollars . . "
-Senate Estimates/Press Club Briefing, Air Commodore John Harvey, 2006
". . the JSF Price (for Australia) - US$55 million average for our aircraft . . in 2006 dollars . ."
-Senate Estimates/Media AVM John Harvey ACM Angus Houston, Nov. 2006-
“…DMO is budgeting around A$131 million in 2005 dollars as the unit procurement cost for the JSF. .”
-AVM John Harvey Briefing, Office of the Minister for Defence, May 2007-
“There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct”
-Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep./Oct. 2007-
“…I would be surprised if the JSF cost us anymore than A$75 million … in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92”
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO DMO, July 2008-
". . Dr Gumley's evidence on the cost of the JSF was for the average unit recurring flyaway cost for the Australian buy of 100 aircraft . ."
-JSCFADT/Media AVM John Harvey, Aug. 2008-
Confirmed previous advice i.e. A$75 million in 2008 dollars at an exchange rate of 0.92,
-JSCFADT Dr Steve Gumley, CEO of the DMO, Sep. 2009-
" ...about $77 million per copy."
-Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Feb. 2008.
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